The African warlord revisited by Freeman, Laura
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=fswi20
Download by: [University of Cape Town Libraries] Date: 09 November 2015, At: 02:35
Small Wars & Insurgencies
ISSN: 0959-2318 (Print) 1743-9558 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fswi20
The African warlord revisited
Laura Freeman
To cite this article: Laura Freeman (2015) The African warlord revisited, Small Wars &
Insurgencies, 26:5, 790-810, DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2015.1072318
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2015.1072318
© 2015 The Author(s). Published by Taylor &
Francis.
Published online: 08 Nov 2015.
Submit your article to this journal 
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
RESEARCH ARTICLE
The African warlord revisited
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To date, warlordism in Africa has been viewed solely negatively. This has
come about, in part, because of the analytical lenses that have been used.
Typically, warlordism has been examined at the state level; and behavioural
traits, rather than definitionally necessary components, have been the focus.
In effect, ‘warlord’ has been confused with other violent actors. I suggest
here a reconceptualisation ‘from below’, which takes into account variation
in types of warlordism, and which allows for both positive and negative
effects of warlordism on society and the state.
Keywords: warlord; warlordism; Africa; rebellion; violence; weak state;
governance
In 1989, in a special issue of the Review of African Political Economy, an
academic consensus was established that the term ‘warlord’ was useful in the
African context.1 From the issue flowed a surge of scholarly interest and
empirical study of warlordism that lasted through the 1990s and into the 2000s.
‘Warlords’ were seen everywhere – from Mogadishu-based ‘General’ Aideed, to
Liberian rebel-cum-president Charles Taylor, to Joseph Kony and his Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) in Uganda, to Inkatha leaders in the Natal region of
South Africa, to Foday Sankoh of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra
Leone. And yet now, with some form of war or political violence in half of
Africa’s states, we might ask: where are all the warlords? The use of the term to
apply to actors of contemporary war and violence seems to have vanished.
I argue here that this has occurred not because there are no longer cases of
warlordism in Africa, but because certain conceptual problems have been created
around the African warlord. The conceptualisation that was generated in the
1990s tended to be focused on high-level, infamous characters. This top-down
approach concentrated on the warlord or rebel leaders themselves, and generally
only included those who had the capacity to directly challenge state power,
be it through circumstances or political ambition. From this arose a static and
indeterminate view of the African warlord. Actors – both individuals and
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groups – as widely divergent as Charles Taylor, the LRA, and ‘General’ Aideed
all became designated ‘warlord’. If a rebel actor who becomes president of one
country and aided rebels in another; a group who have sought (and failed) for
decades to overthrow a government from both within the state and across borders;
and a man and his ill-trained militia in a capital city who have no aspiration
to government position can all be termed ‘warlord’, what is it actually to be an
African warlord?
The vagueness that came to develop around the warlord occurred because the
term was (and still to this day is) being used to reflect certain political and violent
behaviour rather than certain definitional traits. In effect, all actors in African
wars who are seen to lack popular support, use excessively cruel forms of
violence, and who operate outwith the state are liable to be assigned ‘warlords’.
Of course, the loose application of ‘warlord’ in Africa has been noted, and there is
broad agreement that much of the use of the term lacks analytic value because it
is used to describe a multitude of non-state violent actors.2 Over time, ‘warlord’
has evolved to apply to prominent groups, as defined by clan, tribe, ethnicity, or
religion, who use armed civilian followers to execute their policies and
ambitions.3 During civil wars the term ‘warlord’ is ‘most loosely used to identify
potentially any armed protagonist whatever their motivation’.4
In effect, the warlord in Africa came to be presented in a solely negative light.
From feudal Europe to republican China, warlordism is a long-standing and
historicised phenomenon; and warlords have been seen as part and parcel of state
formation. In medieval Europe, warlords – or feudal lords – are viewed as a
necessary part of state development (as Tilly says, ‘war made the state and the
state made war’).5 In China, warlords surfaced as the imperial dynasty collapsed,
and they were viewed as, at least partly, legitimate in their use of conventional
force and the loyalty they created in their locale.6 In contemporary literature,
while warlords of the Middle East and Asia are seen to both cause problems and
pose certain positive solutions,7 research on the African warlord has remained
prodigiously negative. Warlords in Africa are colourfully typified as ‘unattractive
and shadowy figures’, ‘worms in the entrails of a natural man’, as ‘no more than
. . . entrepreneur[s] of conflict’, and as ‘the hyena of the conflict zone’.8 Scholars
depict warlords as self-interested actors out for their own wealth and power, and
as thugs who engage in arbitrary violence against those under their control.
Together, these kinds of classifications have resulted in the use of the term
‘warlord’ becoming too broad and ambiguous, often blurring the lines between
warlords and other rebel (and even state) actors. Indeed, ‘warlord’ has been
ascribed to a range of sub-state actors who exercise power outwith internationally
accepted, Westphalian norms. Warlords are the archetypal illegitimate agents of
violence as generated by the ‘new wars’ thesis. In political analyses, where
the state is the dominant (and legitimate) unit of analysis, warlords are seen to
unhelpfully fragment the state and cause the disintegration of society. However,
in light of the weakness of some African states and the existence of ‘ungoverned
spaces’, these assertions seem rather too strong.










































Given the strange disappearance of the contemporary African warlord, and the
static, vague and resolutely disapproving views of experiences of warlordism on
the continent, I argue it is time to revisit the warlord conceptually. While attempts
have been made to definitionally narrow our conception,9 much of the academic
and popular literatures still utilises ‘warlord’ loosely. Rather, I suggest analysis of
warlordism from ‘below’. By looking at context and local effects, we come to see
that thewarlord can represent and encompass a number of things. I propose that the
warlord as a concept needs to be defined by essential or necessary characteristics,
as well as those that are commonly identified but not necessary.When we examine
the warlord in this way, we realise that the current characterisation of the African
warlord – as lacking legitimacy and using excessive violence – misses
definitionally required features, such as the warlord’s autonomy from the state and
the need for perpetual violence to assert authority. I argue that while the dominant
and disparaging assessment of the African ‘warlord’ may, at times, be accurate,
there is greater variation and nuance within this actor of political violence.
We should include a ‘continuum of warlordism’ in our thinking on the
phenomenon,10 and, in so doing, come to recognise differing experiences and
effects of warlordism. Furthermore, this approach has the benefit of recognising
that warlords are not static – that they can morph into other types of actors,
including rebels, politicians, freedom fighters, etc.
This article will be structured in two sections. The first will conceptualise
warlordism in Africa. The second will aim to explore briefly why the African
warlord has come to be seen as socially detrimental.
Defining the warlord: Essential and common characteristics
Warlords are, in many senses, lords of war. These local strongmen (and warlords
are almost always men) operate in their fiefdom-like locales, autonomous from
the state. And yet, by definition, warlords do not require war; they only require a
political vacuum. Indeed, it may be, at times, more accurate to typify the warlord
as operating under ‘armed peace’ rather than overt conflict.11 Warlords require
the continual use or threat of violence in order to secure their military and
political position. In this way, the warlord can maintain their status through
relatively low quantities of violence, well below that required for a civil war.12
Nonetheless, the term ‘warlord’ is predominantly employed to describe actors
operating within conditions of war, especially intrastate war. This is the first of
many conceptual ambiguities in both the academic literature and popular
discourse around the warlord.
‘Warlord’ is commonly used to describe both the individual – the warlord –
and the group – the warlord organisation or militia. In this way, the entity is
often referred to as a single actor – the warlord.13 I will also use the term
interchangeably, with emphasis put where needed. The warlord – that is both
the warlord himself and the warlord organisation – has four essential











































over a geographic space; the warlord is independent from the state; and the
warlord requires the perpetuation of violence in order to maintain power. There
is one essential prerequisite: the warlord requires anarchy. In addition, there are
two common characteristics of the warlord, which are often empirically noted,
but are not required for a group or individual to be defined ‘warlord’. The
warlord is often associated with a lack of popular legitimacy or support, and
with using barbaric violence. As we will later show, these common elements –
not the essential characteristics – have come to be the means by which the
African warlord is currently defined. We will now go through each of these
features in turn.
The necessary context: Local anarchy
African states whose governments fail to provide public goods and services to the
entire country are prone to warlordism. Put simply, the Weberian definition of the
state requires it to possess a monopoly of legitimate coercive force over its
territory. States must have a territory which they rule, a population whom they
rule, absolute authority over that territory and population, and must exercise and
regulate their power through a legal domain.14 It is important that government
institutions are objective, rational, and impersonal, with a separation between
politics and economics. However, a number of African states are inflicted by neo-
patrimonialism, corruption, criminalisation of the state, and insecurity. Typically,
weak states lack presence in border regions and rural areas, which then become
‘ungoverned spaces’. Without a monopoly over the use of force in these areas,
and with the exclusion of certain groups from the political realm, African nations
become prone to insurgent groups and conflict. Warlords are one of the groups
that can emerge. They have the opportunity to emerge when structure, authority,
power, law, and civil order fragments, leaving a political vacuum to be filled.
In this regard, the rise of warlordism can be seen as a reflection of the problems of
governance and limited state capacity in Africa.15
It is beyond the scope of this article to delve fully into the nature of the
African state, but suffice to say here that warlords can only emerge in a context of
anarchy. This does not require state-level anarchy, but instead can represent areas
where the state, for all intents and purposes, is not present – where it is unable to
provide public goods and services. Warlords are more likely to emerge where
states are strongly regionalised, as a result of either complex geography, large
size, or ethnic or religious composition.16 In particular, states which experience
the concomitant breakdown of central authority and institutional decay of the
government and fragmented or regionalised politics are likely to experience
warlordism.17 Under these conditions, governments become unable to provide
general protective services to isolated or marginalised populations. Peoples living
in remote areas are vulnerable to security attacks and prone to support those who
can offer them security.18 In this context, alternative means of politics come to
develop. Where central authority is limited, weak, or has collapsed, the rise of










































warlordism can be viewed as part of a societal effort to restore stability within an
anarchic environment. Thus, it may be reasonable to view the warlord as ‘an
anachronistic form of political authority . . . prior to the state in both historical
and analytical senses’.19 Warlords are a manifestation of pre-modern political
formations, which become necessary in the context of anarchy.
In Africa’s recent history, warlordism has emerged since the end of anti-
colonial movements and independence, and has become yet more prevalent since
the end of the Cold War. The rise of warlordism was seen to denote the decline of
ideological pleas for ‘national liberation’ in Africa, and the fracturing of many
post-colonial ‘quasi states’.20 The majority of African warlords were initially
political faction leaders operating at the national level, who, excluded from the
political fora, adapted their activities to focus on the locale.21 Warlords tended to
emerge in the poorest and weakest states, such as Chad (especially in the 1970s),
Somalia (1990s), and the Democratic Republic of Congo (1990s–2000s). After
the removal of superpower interest in sub-Saharan Africa, the breakdown of the
state accelerated and government rule devolved to the capital city.22 Regional
political vacuums came to exist, which lead to the rise of warlords and other rebel
groups. Warlordism has most commonly occurred where members of the national
military or political faction leader decide to defect, move back to their locale and
set up alternative power bases to the state. This typically occurs among soldiers
who are frustrated with their military lives, often manifested in their failure to
move up the ranks and to gain either the wealth or authority they perceive they
deserve. These soldiers, often with low levels of formal education, have few
alternative means of living.23 In this way, warlordism has come to exist where
internal military structures and discipline have collapsed.
In summary, the weak African state, insofar as it can be generalised in this
way, provides the conditions for the emergence of alternative forms of rule,
especially at the subnational level. Poor state infrastructure, an inability to
provide public goods and services, deficient security, and lacking military
discipline causes political vacuums. This provides a context for warlordism.
It enables the dissatisfied faction leader and/or soldier to become a strong military
and political leader at the locale.
Essential characteristics of the warlord
The centrality of the warlord
The warlord organisation is defined by its top-heavy leadership structure. Power
is focused on the warlord, who has his own private army or militia that responds
to him. His personal militia can number from ten to several thousand fighters.24
The warlord achieves political power because of military power and, therefore, is
both a military and political leader. Often, the warlord is a trusted and known
local strongman.25 The centrality of the warlord as an individual has several
effects on the nature of leadership within the warlord organisation. The warlord’s











































both of which ensure loyalty from his local followers.26 The latter source of
authority explains the warlord’s continual need for economic spoils: the warlord
becomes central to the network of resource control, and, consequently, central to
the warlord organisation. Patronage networks are made up of personal ties, which
generate and allocate resources according to the priorities of the warlord. The
consequences of this are as much (if not more) political than they are economic.
By controlling means of accumulation and distribution, warlords come to
monopolise political power.27 In this way, patronage and accumulation needs to
be understood as the means by which the warlord acquires political power, which
is necessary for him.
The warlord as a character is so central that, if he is removed – killed,
arrested, or otherwise – the warlord organisation as a whole collapses. For
example, after the death of General Aideed in 1996, the organisation dismantled
and other forms of governance, including the Islamic Courts, emerged in southern
Mogadishu.28 And yet the warlord’s position is ever-fragile. If they become too
weak or too greedy, they come to undermine their power. Loyalty to warlords
from their militia can weaken if the warlord becomes unable to provide material
goods.29 Similarly, support from the surrounding population will diminish if he
can no longer provide security, public goods, and local patronage. As Marten
states, ‘[w]ise warlords share the wealth to maintain personal loyalty’.30 Thus,
to survive, the warlord must command certain loyalties, undoubtedly from his
militia and potentially from those residing in his area of control.
The source of the warlord’s individual leadership is mimicked in the warlord
organisation. Every member of the warlord political community is part of a
military organisation, and even the economy becomes engrossed with themilitary.
In general, this means that the military comes to impose on every aspect of
political life and, in so doing, civil–military relations collapse into one.31 Through
these internal structures, a ‘gang mentality’ forms, which can permit certain forms
of gratuitous violence, particularly with competing groups.32 The warlord himself
is central to these processes.
Geographical control
Second, the warlord is defined by geography. The warlord organisation seeks
control over a territorial area. In general, the warlord comes to seize control over
relatively small slices of land. The territorial area is typically demarcated by the
groups living in it and the resources available. The warlord will seek territory
with extractable ‘rents’, be they raw materials – diamonds, oil, timber, etc. – as
well as ‘taxes’ that are obtained from the local population. In selecting his
territorial area of control, the warlord ignores predetermined state provinces and
even national borders. Rather, the warlord territory is defined by access to
resources and can fluctuate somewhat on this basis.33 Similarly, the expansion
or movement of warlords’ ‘domain of effective power’ provides the context for
militarism and violence. Warlords are most likely to use force – often against










































competing or neighbouring warlords – in order to retain and attain their
geographical sphere of influence.34
Warlord independence from the state
Third, and relatedly, the warlord operates autonomously from the state. This does
not mean that relations between the warlord and the government will not develop,
where mutually beneficial. Indeed, a warlord may be a useful ally for the state,
used typically to control rebel groups.35 However, it does mean that a warlord
does not seek state power. If a warlord comes to have enlarged political interests
– such as striving to control a whole state or establish a new state of his own – he
can no longer be categorised as a warlord but becomes a prince or a president
instead.36 By definition, warlords aim to prevent state consolidation in the areas
in which they operate.37 As such, it is incorrect to characterise Africa’s
archetypal ‘warlord’ – Charles Taylor – as a warlord when seeking presidency in
Liberia.38 Arguably, it is possible to describe Taylor as a warlord during his
presidency, if one argues he chose to actively fragment state structures and came
to operate outwith the state; but, if this is the case, Taylor is a highly atypical
warlord. This represents a wider problem in the literature on the African warlord,
where little or no distinction is made between warlords who operate outwith the
state and states ruled by former warlords.39 As classically (and correctly)
conceived, the warlord is independent from any higher authority and is capable of
controlling territory at a local or subnational level.40 He exercises effective
control over his territory through his military organisation, of which he is the
highest authority, and which is separate from the state. In this sense, Somalia’s
‘General’ Aideed – a former army colonel – is a classical warlord: he sought
control (against self-proclaimed ‘President’ Ali Mahdi Muhammad) of
Mogadishu, but did not seek power beyond the capital. Aideed was able to
recruit away from clan delineations in the urban setting and based his power on
his ability to provide patronage to the otherwise disenfranchised mooryaan –
young, unemployed Somali men.41 In this regard, Aideed was a warlord; and
Taylor was a rebel-cum-president who, arguably, became a ‘warlord president’.
Warlords, in general, do not challenge state power, but if warlords are
carrying out their operations in regions characterised by weak state power it is
possible for them to challenge the state itself.42 They can transform into state-
makers at the local level. In these cases, warlords’ abilities to impose control over
markets, power and people can outweigh those of the state. By controlling a
territorial space, warlords can displace state agents and rules. However, this is not
the same as the warlord seeking national political power. Rather, local rule and
dislodging the state is the means by which the warlord comes to be autonomous.
This is the key defining characteristic that separates warlords from other violent
actors. Rebels and insurgents seek to challenge and overthrow central authority.
They directly threaten and often seek state power. Warlords, on the other hand,











































They are not politically motivated to affect national policy or to become
enveloped in the state. Consequently, I argue that it is more useful to view
warlordism from below, as a phenomenon that arises at the local level. The
national-level focus of the 1990s, and consequent conflation of rebels (who use
excessive violence) and warlords, created an atypical context from which
warlordism was thought to arise.
The warlord and violence
Fourth, warlords require the frequent use of violence in order to maintain their
position. As alluded to, the warlord’s political power is intrinsically tied to his
military capacity. Violence is used habitually to reassert the warlord’s power.
Inherently connected to this process is the imperative of economic access: profits
are of utmost importance to all warlords for harvesting power and sustaining the
warlord organisation. To gain economic access, warlords rely on violence, which
is used to achieve simultaneous military, political, and economic dominance.
While all warlords require the use of violence to self-sustain, the nature and
extent of this violence varies considerably. The kinds of violence used depend on
the local context: the type of resources the warlord seeks to access; the
relationship between the warlord and the civilian population; and the military and
technical capabilities of the organisation.
First, the type of resource or the nature of the warlord organisation’s income
affects the type and levels of violence. The warlord may seek control over
resources or they may rely on local rents or taxes from the local population.
Where some may have a monopoly over easily extractable or lootable resources,
such as surface minerals and timber, others may aim to control unlootable
resources, such as deep-shaft mines, which require more sophisticated extractive
technologies.43 The type of resource the warlord seeks depends on their broader
capabilities. Warlord organisations that are more complex, sophisticated, and far
reaching tend to develop more extensive extractive capabilities. Naturally, the
location, density, and type of resource dictate the types of violence that are
required to control it successfully. This may vary from overtaking and guarding
a fixed area – in the case of mining – or disrupting local populations in order to
access ground resources.
In connection, the warlord’s commercial market access is of relevance. The
potential for economic success is amplified bymodern technology: ‘the warlord in
the war zone in [Congo] is only a phone call away from the broker in Wall
Street’.44 The connection of the African warlord to international markets has both
changed the necessary relation of the warlord to the locale and affected their
violent behaviour. On the one hand, modern networks of (often-illicit) trade
tremendously increase the warlord’s ability to remain both isolated from the state
and internationally connected and prosperous.45 On the other hand, they alsomean
that the warlord must actually ensure stability in their locale. Violence ensures
control and a means of maintaining stability; but, in general, this means the










































warlord has no appetite for fully fledged war or open combat.46 Seeing as violence
is likely to reduce production levels, warlords operating in ‘armed peace’ –
conditions where they threaten violence but do not enact it on a large scale – are
likely to accrue greater rents.47 In effect, violence becomes limited.
Second, the extent of the warlord’s violence depends on the nature of their
interaction with the local population. Warlords may come to establish contractual
relations with the people in their territory.Warlords may demand labour, livestock
and crops, tools and machinery, as well as taxes and military service (including
participation in raids, defending sites and assets, etc.). In return, they may supply
public and private goods, including education, infrastructure and roads, transport,
protection, food and shelter. This transactional relationship mimics that between
government and citizens. Thus thewarlord can transformhis territory into a type of
civilian administration or ‘protostate’, ‘quasi-government’, and/or ‘embryonic
state’.48 In particular, producers utilise warlord protection in order to ensure the
continuation of production. From the output, warlords extract rents.49 Only more
sophisticated warlord organisations are able to transform their territory into a
protostate and, in so doing, develop a form of partial legitimacy.50 Relatedly,
warlord violence can vary according to competition levels for taxes and rents.
Contending warlords are likely to engage in violence in order to either preserve or
extend their spheres of influence; and the concentration of rents themselves is
likely to influence the levels of competition.51
Third, levels of warlord violence depend on military and technological
capabilities. Conceptually, methods of violence can fit along much of the military
spectrum, from conventional and highly trained to unconventional and poorly
equipped. In addition, it is possible for the warlord to have access to a number of
armed forces varying from soldiers-turned-rebels or ‘sobels’ to armed gangs.52 In
practice, many African warlords have weak military capabilities. They are unable
to engage in open combat with other armed groups (including competing
warlords) and, instead, tend to focus their violence at local, civilian
populations.53 Herein lies the potential for the warlord to utilise high qualities
of violence, including the use of terror, in the absence of their ability to use high
quantities of force.
Through these three factors – resource type, civilian interaction, and military
capabilities – we can deduce that the variation in type and nature of warlord
violence is (at least conceptually) incredibly mixed. While all warlords must use
violence in order to retain their position, a great number of intervening factors
affect how violence is actually conducted. Indeed, in situations of varied local
factors, the same warlord’s use of force is likely to change over time.
To summarise, by definition, the warlord must reflect an organisation that
combines military and political power, in which the warlord himself is central,
and which seeks control over a geographically defined space that is independent
from the state. While the warlord may, in effect, undermine the state in the area
under his control, he does not seek state or national position. Rather, he desires











































control the local population. In general, the extent of a warlord’s independence
from a state and society varies according to the relative size, military capabilities,
and wealth of the warlord organisation. Combined, the resources the warlord
seeks to control, and the nature of his relations to the local population (and the
state), dictate the nature and levels of violence the warlord uses. What is
conceptually important is that the nature of the warlord’s power, which combines
the military and the political, requires the perpetual use or threat of violence.
Furthermore, warlordism as a phenomenon can vary significantly and should be
placed on a continuum: from limited formations based at the very local level and
with limited capacities, to extensive regional structures that wield power on the
basis of military power and personal charisma. As a result, warlordism can
manifest in forms of gangsterism, at the one end of the scale, to regional proto-
nationalist movements at the other end.54 Of course, over time and circumstance,
a small-scale warlord may come to operate on a much larger basis, and vice versa.
Common warlord characteristics
African warlords are commonly regarded to be lacking popular legitimacy and
support, and as using excessive violence. In fact, neither of these characteristics is
necessary. There is sufficient variation within the very concept of the warlord that
they can be either illegitimate or (at least partly) legitimate, and they can use
excessive, irrational violence, or require low levels of (rational) violence. This
variation is conceptually consistent. These commonly noted, but not necessary,
elements of warlordism have come to shape the popular, negative narrative of
African warlords.
The warlord’s legitimacy
First, warlords are commonly seen to be illegitimate. This occurs where warlords
control the local population through fear and coercion, often involving ‘barbaric’
or excessive forms of violence (as discussed below). The warlord is unable to
gain, and does not seek, legitimacy among the populations that live in the region
under his control.55 It is indisputably the case that, by definition, warlords do not
require popular legitimacy to exist. Indeed, warlord organisations often take
advantage of local civilians to the same extent that they take advantage of any
other group, since they do not depend on them for support.56 Their very
organisational structure makes them autonomous from the state and enables
autonomy from the local population. However, this does not mean that, in some
cases, warlords do not come to have popular legitimacy. Warlords can provide an
alternative social structure to the state, one that is consistent with the customs,
needs, and desires of the local populations. Indeed, warlords may provide
security and other public goods that are superior to those of the state.57 Through
the establishment of these mutually beneficial transactional relations, the warlord
can come to gain local legitimacy. Writing about the experience of warlords in
Tajikistan, Nourzhanov writes, ‘[a] warlord . . . is not a mere bandit or selfish










































politician with an organised military force. A warlord is a protector and provider
who is accepted by a community . . . as a legitimate leader’.58 It is entirely
possible for the warlord to develop legitimate alternatives to the state, which are
preferred by the local population.
In sum, there can be significant variation within the warlord organisation and
its societal ties, which mean its levels of potential legitimacy can vary greatly.59
The salient point is that warlords, by virtue of their organisational structure and
means of political power, do not require local popular support, but may attain it
due to other reasons.
The warlord as excessively violent
Second, warlords are often associated with excessive and particularly cruel uses
of force. The ‘warlord way of warfare’ is typified by its extreme use of violence,
which often elicits fear and targets civilians. There is an inclination to use terror
and other forms of systematic violence to preserve power relations. These
‘senseless’ methods of violence inflict great suffering on civilian victims for
seemingly futile reasons.60 This results in the fragmentation of society, high
levels of civilian victimisation, and the creation and perpetuation of a violent
society.
While it is undeniable that the warlord, by virtue of deriving political position
frommilitary power, requires the continual use of violence, it does not follow that
this violence must be excessively savage. Indeed, in cases where the warlord
develops a ‘protostate’, brutal violence in abundance would seem both
unnecessary and irrational. In other contexts, the warlord may require continual
violence and a lack of civil order to maintain their stronghold. While violence
may be ruthless, it is not necessarily irrational. Violent acts such as mutilations
ranging from severed noses, lips, and fingers to messages carved on different
body parts are politically symbolic.61 The warlord organisation is able to –
through the use of limited, if grotesque force – display a political message; for
example, to deter locals from participating in elections or other government
processes. These kinds of violence reflect the military position of the warlord.
By virtue of the organisation’s often militarily weak, ill-experienced, and ill-
disciplined power, it adopts unconventional methods of force. This violence,
while graphic, may in fact be limited. It aims to create maximum impact with
minimum use of force in order to maintain the dominance of the warlord.
As we can see from this conceptual discussion, depicting warlords as lacking
popular legitimacy and as utilising irrational violence fails to account for
variation within the actor. By definition, warlords seek autonomy from the state
and do not require local support to do this. They do need local means of coercion
to be able to overpower competing groups militarily and politically, for which
violence is typically used. However, it does not follow that warlords are











































Our current (mis)understanding of the African warlord
Despite the conceptual misgivings, ‘warlord’ has come to be applied to African62
armed groups who are deemed to lack popular support and who use ‘barbaric’
violence. In this way, non-essential characteristics of the warlord have come to be
emphasised and essential components have been sidelined. This has led to two,
somewhat unintuitive yet simultaneous trends. On the one hand, it has led to a
narrow and negative interpretation of the warlord – as harmful to society and
politics. On the other hand, ‘warlord’ has come to be applied too broadly, with a
variety of rebel actors being given the title. To some extent, this has transpired as
part of a wider move to describe African wars as illegitimate and greed-induced.
It has also arisen because of notions of the high-capacity warlord from ‘above’ –
from the state level rather than the local context. In collection, this has degraded
the meaning of the term ‘warlord’ itself. I will now briefly show how the African
warlord has come to be viewed in a skewed and biased way, and make efforts to
explore why this pattern is problematic.
Current definitions – too loose and too narrow
Current conceptualisations of the African warlord fail to distinguish warlords
from other rebel actors. For example, the often assigned ‘warlord’ Sierra Leonean
RUF – while seen as illegitimate, lacking ideology, and using excessive force –
desired and aggressively sought state power. With strong assistance from
Liberia’s then-president, Charles Taylor, the RUF sought to usurp the state.
In this regard, Foday Sankoh or the RUF cannot be conceived as ‘warlord’.
Similarly, Joseph Kony and the LRA have been designated as ‘warlord’ where
they are more accurately rebel or insurgent (or some form of hybrid). As with the
RUF, literature on the LRA has focused on their ‘methods of violence’, which has
involved the grotesque and vivid use of force.63 Once more, it was the analysis of
the groups as lacking legitimacy and using unwarranted violence that led to the
designation of ‘warlord’. This dilutes the warlord to meaning something like
‘illegitimate and violent rebel’ or even ‘barbaric thug’. Yet, warlords are
distinguished from rebels because they do not seek state power. By ignoring this,
the term takes on a judgemental position rather than an analytical one.
Furthermore, this kind of conceptualisation ignores the possibility that
warlord and insurgent structures may coexist and interact – for example, a
warlord organisation may finance a rebellion. The possibility of this coexistence
– of warlords and rebels working symbiotically – remains under-researched.64
And yet, just as we know the state may align with warlord groups,65 it is possible
for rebels or other non-state groups to do the same. One interesting case comes
from KwaZulu-Natal during South Africa’s transition period in the 1990s. While
warlordism is most commonly associated with the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)
(who were often supported by the apartheid state), Mathis points out that the
African National Congress (ANC), fearing their loosening influence in the
region, came to associate with and recruit warlords.66 An alliance of the ANC










































to local warlords became mutually beneficial: the ANC was able to maintain
influence and the warlords were able to gain power locally. In other
circumstances, it is possible for rebel organisations to actually transition into
warlord groups and vice versa. Rebel organisations with weak military positions
whose political aims are unattainable may fall to warlordism in order to secure
income and local power. The LRA may be a good case in point. Conversely,
warlords who come to see benefits in state-level power – be it because peace has
become imminent or broader personal aims – may become rebels or politicians.
Similarly, it is not helpful to conceive of warlords narrowly – as solely
negative actors of political violence. They can arise and come to have multiple
effects on society – both positive and negative. Defining warlords as purely
negative places judgements on the actors before any real analysis has taken place.
It fails to force analytical questions such as: How does the nature of the state
create conditions for warlordism to occur? Can warlords offer an alternative to
the state? Is warlordism a necessary part of state formation in Africa? Can we
conceive of warlords, in some cases, as regionally or locally legitimate?
Moreover, it ignores the weak position of many African states. Thus, any
conception of warlordism needs to allow for variation. This suggestion is not
novel; Jackson in particular has presented the potentially positive effects and
contributions of warlords. He argues that warlords should be seen as an
alternative form of governance and not as the irrational anarchists that scholars
depict.67 For example, ‘local warlord’ Mayi Mayi groups of eastern Democratic
Republic of Congo are a reflection of the context of a disintegrating state and
insecurity in an increasingly militarised area. Warlords at the local level (often
called ‘strongmen’) can offer alternative means of political access for otherwise
marginalised groups.68
Similarly, Wantchekon works to dispel the notion that the emergence of
warlords will lead to the perpetuation of war and an absence of peace. He argues
that ‘intelligent’ warlords – those who act to preserve their own interests – will
seek peace over war when conditions dictate that this course is most beneficial.69
Wantchekon’s theoretically persuasive work importantly challenges the notion
that warlords require the disintegration of the state. Indeed, he contends that when
war becomes a stalemate and starts to hinder the warlord economically, he will
opt for peace and state reintegration. These ‘intelligent’ warlords recognise the
benefits of peace, and therefore, peace can emerge from anarchy. In this way,
warlords show themselves to not lead to the eternal and spiralling degradation of
the state and society, as is most commonly presented. This thinking also shows the
mechanisms by which warlords may transition into politicians. However, this type
of analysis remains on the periphery of discourse regarding African warlords.
African warlordism and ‘new wars’ – a Western bias
The broad and overwhelmingly negative application and interpretation of the











































on the continent. Warlords are seen as the archetypal actors in the ‘new’ wars
(post-Cold War) literature. They are typified as being motivated by selfish greed,
lacking ideology, perpetuating the continual use of violence, and completely
illegitimate.70 Supporting this intellectual movement is quantitative analysis
of civil wars in Africa, which, roughly speaking, depicts rebels as motivated
primarily by greed.71 This type of analysis has typified the study of warlordism in
Africa.72 In this way, ‘warlord’ is a loaded term with pejorative connotations such
as illegitimate, coercive, and savage.
Warlords are seen to ‘offend the basic precepts of Western liberalism’, as
actors willing and able to ignore the rule of law.73 The international community
and academics tend to be biased in their analysis of warlords because, despite the
nature of the African state, international relations and political analysis exists
predominantly at the state level.74 There is an inflexibility in analysing other
forms of power and politics. In effect, non-state forms become, de facto,
illegitimate. Ahram and King argue ‘the normative thicket created by assuming
that states alone enjoys a monopoly over the use of force’ limits our ability to
examine non-state violent actors. Indeed, they make clear that such actors –
regardless of their other features – are ‘dismissed with opprobrium’.75 Relatedly,
this illustrates the tendency to focus on charismatic and state-challenging
characters such as Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh, or Joseph Kony, which has
skewed study from the local to the state level.
Reflecting this wider bias, Hills wryly argues that a warlord is not a warlord
‘When he’s pro-Western’.76 Indeed, on occasion, the West has co-opted or
otherwise legitimised the African warlord. The UN in Somalia in the early 1990s,
for example, chose to negotiate with Mogadishu warlords (who held military
power) rather than local clan leaders (who had political legitimacy). A reflection
of societal misunderstandings by US commanders, this had the disastrous result
of giving political legitimacy to warlords over and above local, established
mechanisms of authority.77 More recently, we have seen this occur in Libya,
where NATO supported anti-Gaddafi strongmen.78 Importantly, these actors
become legitimised ‘from above’, at the international level, and not necessarily at
the local level.
The economic elements of warlordism have been overemphasised
Within the literature, there has been a tendency to stress the international market
or economic capacities of the warlord, in particular to connect the warlord to
organised criminal networks. This has skewed our understanding of warlords in
several ways, not least because it leads to conceptualisations of the warlords
as unconnected and entirely illegitimate in their regional or national context.
This typology has unhelpfully removed the possibility of warlords having
communitarian connections.79
Robinson, for example, argues that, by definition, warlords must be
‘motivated [solely] by narrow, commercial self-interest’.80 Nourzhanov argues










































this approach is overly restrictive, instead suggesting that warlords can act in the
interest of communities as well as egoistically.81 Robinson appears to conflate the
state and society: while the warlord requires the disintegration of the state (at
least in some respects) in order to exist, it does not necessarily follow that he
requires the disintegration of society, or that state and societal disintegration are
necessarily linked. Similarly, Vinci hints that the common typology of warlords
as ‘businessmen of war’ may have been overstated.82 I take this position more
strongly. While the warlord clearly needs access to economic resources, it is not
necessarily the case that the warlord’s initial and primary motives are personal
enrichment. Indeed, the case of South Africa suggests that maintaining traditional
power dynamics was central to warlord formations.83 Thus, while economic
accumulation is important to many warlords, it is not necessarily the only or most
important explanation of warlord behaviour. Economic explanations of
warlordism are just one set of causes of the phenomenon.84
Conclusion
So, has the African warlord disappeared? Our warlords of the 1990s have had
mixed outcomes: many have died, some have become politicians, others have
become rebel leaders, and some – notably in the DRC – have remained. Where
transition has occurred, this is often a reflection of changing national
circumstances: South Africa stabilised from the mid-1990s; conflict in Somalia
has changed in nature; Sierra Leone and Liberia have become peaceful. However,
preconditions for warlordism – uneven state authority and the existence of
ungoverned spaces – exist in many states today, for example: Central African
Republic, Mali, Sudan and South Sudan, and Libya. In these and other states,
more conditions exist: for example, politics is regionalised or based on the
inclusion and exclusion of certain groups; national military forces are weak and
poorly organised; the provision of public goods and services is unequal; access to
national resources is poorly managed; and unemployment, especially among the
youth, remains high. In this way, the potential for warlordism is ever present.
Rather, what is clear is that the model of warlordism that developed from the
1990s is unhelpful in certain ways. It generated an overwhelmingly negative
perception of warlordism on the continent, where there should, in fact, be space to
examine potential positive impacts of warlord organisations or to recognise the
contexts in which warlord groups arise. Rather, warlords are confused with other
types of non-state violent actors – in particular rebels – and have come to typify
illegitimate, clandestine, and brutal challenges to state power. I have argued here
that we need to be more disciplined in our designation. By focusing on
definitionally required components of warlordism, rather than common (but not
necessary) behavioural traits, we can come to have more accurate and
analytically fruitful study of the phenomenon. This will clear the way for
questions of pertinence to be asked, such as: Who is a modern African warlord?











































organisation? And do warlords provide alternative forms of governance in the
context of a anarchy?
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12. The accepted ballpark number being 1000 fatalities over the course of a civil war,
with an average of at least 100 per year.
13. See Vinci, ‘Like Worms’, 318.
14. Young, The African Colonial State, 26–31.
15. Szeftel, ‘Warlords and Problems of Democracy’.
16. Giustozzi, ‘The Debate on Warlordism’, 15.
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28. Barnes and Hassan, ‘The Rise and Fall of Mogadishu’s Islamic Courts’, 152.
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31. Vinci, ‘Like Worms’, 321; Rich, ‘Warlords, State Fragmentation’, 88.
32. Jackson, ‘Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance’, 138.
33. Ibid., 147.
34. Charlton and May, ‘Warlords and Militarism in Chad’, 17.
35. African states have been known to ‘subcontract organised violence’ to warlords
who have the ability to control a disorderly border region, control migration
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the other side of the border. See Ahram and King, ‘The Warlord as Arbitrageur’,
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were supported by the apartheid state. See Mathis, ‘From Warlords to Freedom
Fighters’, 433.
36. Giustozzi, ‘Respectable Warlords?’, 3.
37. Marten, ‘Warlordism in Comparative Perspective’, 47.
38. For example, Harris writes: ‘Given the international reputation of Taylor as a brutal
warlord whose sole aim had never wavered from the capture of power in Monrovia
[i.e. state power] . . . ’ (emphasis added), see ‘From “Warlord” to “Democratic”
President’, 431. I highlight Harris here not to individually point him out, but to
indicate a wider acceptance in the literature that has sidelined the vital characteristic
of warlords, specifically, their independence from the state. References or allusions
to Charles Taylor as a warlord are common; even Robinson and MacKinlay, in
pieces that explicitly aim at defining the warlord, include him in their conception.
See Robinson, ‘Twenty-First Century Warlords’, 125; and MacKinlay, ‘Defining
Warlords’ and ‘War Lords’. And yet, logically, the point seems obvious: a character
who relies on the disintegration of the state cannot then come to desire its (re)
integration without becoming something qualitatively different.
39. Marten, ‘Warlordism in Comparative Perspective’, 46–47.
40. Giustozzi, ‘Respectable Warlords?’, 2.
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46. Jackson, ‘Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance’, 147–148.
47. Skaperdas, ‘Warlord Competition’, 440–441. Skaperdas also lays out why
bargaining towards ‘armed peace’ is inherently difficult for warlords. As in
Hobbes’s state of nature, Skaperdas points out that without a higher authority, it is
impossible for warlords to enforce contracts between themselves. This leads to a
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58. Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the Nation or Robber Barons?’, 126.
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limited to the locale. The warlord organisation is unlikely to be legitimised by the
state as they operate autonomously from it, and because a state endorsement would
be self-undermining (for both the state and the warlord).
60. Vinci, ‘Like Worms’, 317, 324; Rich, ‘Warlords, State Fragmentation’, 85.
61. Richards, ‘New Political Violence in Africa’, 436–437.
62. In current parlance, warlord is applied overwhelmingly to Africans. It is also used to
describe some actors in Afghanistan (see Giustozzi, ‘Respectable Warlords?’; and
Stanski, ‘So These Folks are Aggressive’), Tajikistan (see Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of
the Nation or Robber Barons?’), and, occasionally in Latin America, most
commonly, Colombia (see Jones, ‘Parainstitutional Violence’).
63. Vinci, ‘The Strategic Use of Fear’, 369–373.
64. Reno alludes to the potential relations of warlords to other rebel and state groups.
As he puts it, ‘[t]hese interlocking relationships produce very complex conflicts’; see
Warfare in Independent Africa, 165. Reno asserts that so-called ‘parochial rebels’ –
those who arm local networks based on local identity – are likely to partner with
warlord organisations. Similarly, Lezhnev suggests that ‘partial warlord groups’ or
‘ethno-warlords’ may come to exist and have warlord components; see Crafting
Peace, 12–13. It is clearly necessary for more research to take place to unpack the
workings dynamics of these potential interlinkages. It will be important to maintain
that while rebel movements can become warlord organisations, and warlord
organisations can become rebel movements, and rebel movements may have
warlords attached to them, warlords and rebels are conceptually separate entities.
65. See note 35.
66. Mathis, ‘From Warlords to Freedom Fighters’, 424. Mathis notes two prominent
ANC-affiliated warlords – Sipho Mkhize and Mkhandi Shozi – who ‘acted openly
as warlords for most of the 1980s and then were either killed or driven into partial
hiding in the 1990s’; see ‘From Warlords to Freedom Fighters’, 432.
67. Jackson, ‘Warlords as Alternative Forms of Governance’, 132.
68. Vlassenroot and van Acker, ‘War as Exist from Exclusion?’, 55–56.
69. Wantchekon, ‘The Paradox of “Warlord” Democracy’. Similarly, Giustozzi has
attempted to show the positive impacts of ‘enlightened’ warlords in Afghanistan,
arguing that warlords have the potential to gain legitimacy from the state and become
enveloped within central administration (and thus transition from warlord to regional
leader or politician). See Giustozzi, ‘Respectable Warlords?’.
70. Broadly speaking, the new wars literature posits that while old civil wars were
motivated by communal grievance, private loot incentivises new wars. Where old
wars garnered broad support, new wars lack such popularity (or at least do not
require it). Proponents argue that whereas old wars had controlled violence, new
wars involve unwarranted levels of violence. Both government and rebels are










































depicted as thugs who use violence and unconventional warfare for personal gain.
Clearly, within this distinction, old wars are seen as legitimate and justified, new
wars as illegitimate and unjustified. Differences as outlined by Kalyvas, ‘“New” and
“Old” Civil Wars’, 101–102. For greater detail, see Kaldor, ‘Old Wars, Cold Wars,
New Wars, and the War on Terror’; Mueller, ‘Policing the Remnants of War’.
71. Collier and Hoeffler’s work has been most influential in this regard. Their regression
analysis categorises rebels as motivated either by grievance or by greed. Through
their proxy measures for these categories, they find much stronger correlation
between rebellion and greed. Collier and Hoeffler argue that it is not political
grievance or even political control over territory rebels seek to gain. Instead,
unconventional force is used as a means to gain and secure resource-rich areas,
which the insurgents can then pillage. Importantly, this means rebels may have no
inclination to engage in fighting with government forces and no desire to gain
political power. See Collier and Hoeffler, ‘Greed and Grievance’. Opponents to this
body of work argue that their analysis and conclusions are incorrectly skewed to
economic explanations. For example, Mkandawire notes that, in Africa, no known
insurgent movement has transformed from criminal networks who extend to rebels in
order to accrue economies of scale. See Mkandawire, ‘The Terrible Toll’, 187–188.
Similarly, Kalyvas has pointed out the unnecessary dichotomy in Collier and
Hoeffler’s depiction of rebels as either greedy or aggrieved. See Kalyvas, ‘“New”
and “Old” Civil Wars’, 102.
72. Vinci, ‘Like Worms’, 313–314.
73. Rich, ‘Warlords, State Fragmentation’, 78.
74. MacKinlay, ‘War Lords’, 26.
75. Ahram and King, ‘The Warlord as Arbitrageur’, 170.
76. Hills, ‘Warlords, Militia and Conflict’, 36. In the case of Afghanistan, this distinction
is clear. ‘Afghan warlords’ in the north who were anti-Taliban were heralded by the
United States (who often changed their title to ‘local commanders’ or ‘militia
leaders’). See Stanski, ‘So These Folks are Aggressive’, 73–74.
77. For more see, Lewis, ‘Misunderstanding the Somali Crisis’; Stevenson, ‘Hope
Restored in Somalia?’.
78. Amin, ‘An Imperialist Springtime?’.
79. Henriksen and Vinci, ‘Combat Motivation’, 102.
80. Robinson, ‘Twenty-First Century Warlords’, 125.
81. Nourzhanov, ‘Saviours of the Nation or Robber Barons?’, 110.
82. Vinci, ‘Like Worms’. Vinci points out that economic accumulation is a means to
maintain patronage networks and, consequently, warlord power. In this way, looting
and other forms of accumulation is an essential component of the warlord
organisation behaviour because it helps maintain it. It does not necessarily follow
that the primary or only means of warlord existence is for personal enrichment.
83. Morris and Hindson, ‘South Africa: Political Violence’.
84. Ahram and King, ‘The Warlord as Arbitrageur’, 173.
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